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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the distributional impact of globalization on the poor in urban China. 
Employing the kernel density estimation technique, we recovered from irregularly 
grouped household survey data the income distributions of 29 Chinese provinces for 
1988–2001. Panels of the income shares of the poorest 20, 10 and 5 per cent of the urban 
residents were then compiled. In a fixed-effect model, two of the central conclusions of 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) – that ‘the incomes of the poor rise equi-proportionately with 
average income’ and that trade openness has little distributional effect on poverty – were 
revisited. Our results lend little support to either of the Dollar-Kraay conclusions, but 
instead indicate that average income growth is associated with worsening income 
distribution while globalization in general, and trade openness in particular, raises the 
income shares of the poor. It is also found that openness to trade and openness to FDI 
have differential distributional effects. The beneficial effect of trade was not restricted to 
the coastal provinces, but weakened significantly after 1992. These findings are robust to 
allowing for nonlinearity in the effect of globalization and to controlling for the influence 
of several other variables. 
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Globalization and the Urban Poor in China 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Recent research has revealed the disturbing fact that since the late 1980s progress in 
poverty reduction has stalled in urban China (Ravallion and Chen, 2004) or even been 
reversed (Hussain, 2003; Khan, Griffin and Riskin, 1999). The same period also 
witnessed the engine of China’s economic take-off changed from agricultural growth 
spurred by de-collectivization in the rural areas to manufacturing exports fuelled by large 
FDI inflows. Arguably, the latter is more directly related to the urban areas where most 
manufacturing industries congregate. In view of the ongoing debate on the marginalizing 
impact of globalization on the poor, the concurrence in China of increasing urban poverty 
and growing integration with the global economy deserves a careful examination.  
 
Although a rich literature exists on the issues of inequality and poverty in China, scarcely 
few studies have dealt with the effect of globalization on poverty in urban China. In two 
recent studies, Ravallion and Chen (2004) and Ravallion (2004) found little correlation 
between the expansion of trade and overall poverty reduction. This finding is based on 
national aggregate measures of poverty and trade openness. However, both the level of 
openness and the severity of poverty vary considerably across the Chinese provinces.1 
Also, because urban residents are generally more exposed to the vicissitudes of the global 
economy than are rural residents, the effects of globalization on urban and rural poverty 
may also differ. Hence, even if globalization does impact on poverty, either positively or 
negatively, the relationship may not show up in national average measures. Moreover, 
globalization can affect poverty via two channels: the growth effect and the distributional 
effect. Since there is a general consensus on the positive impact of trade (and FDI inflows) 
on growth, the finding of disassociation between absolute poverty and trade implies a 
negative distributional effect of trade. This is inconsistent with Dollar and Kraay (2002) 
who, in a widely-cited cross-country study, conclude that the poor benefit from 
globalization just as much as the rest of the population. Is China an exception to this 
general pattern?  
 
This paper departs from earlier studies in three aspects. Firstly, by placing the focus on 
the distributional effect of globalization on China’s urban poor, it complements previous 
studies on the total impact of globalization and those on China’s rural poverty. Secondly, 
it examines the impact of both openness to foreign trade and openness to foreign 
investment. Although these two aspects of globalization are closely related, their effects 
on poverty might differ. As shown below, urban China turns out to a case in point. Finally, 
the paper makes use of intra-province distributional data to assemble a provincial panel, 
whereby province-specific heterogeneity can be more readily accommodated. By 
accounting for regional diversity, we consider this one step towards the direction of 
‘looking beyond average’ as urged by Ravallion (2004). 
 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains our 
method of estimating three measures of the income shares of the poor from grouped 
household survey data. This is necessary because we are unable to access household 
                                                 
1 For evidence on regional differences in openness, see Wei and Wu (2002) and Wan, Lu and Chen (2004); 
for evidence on regional variations in poverty, see Khan (1998) and Hussain (2003). 
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records or congruent data for the poor. Preliminary analysis of the trend and regional 
pattern of the three measures is also presented. In section 3, the effects of globalization on 
the three income shares are explored and the robustness of the findings tested. Section 4 
concludes. 
2 Estimating the income shares of the poor 
 
To obtain the urban income distributions in different provinces over time, we draw on the 
annual urban household surveys administered by the National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS).2 The survey data are published in provincial statistical yearbooks, only in grouped 
format where households are classified into consecutive income classes and the 
percentage/number of households in each class is tabulated along with the group mean 
income and average household size. We were able to collect such data for a total of 375 
distributions, covering 29 out of the 31 provinces and province-level cities in mainland 
China (i.e., China excluding Taiwan, Macau and Hong Kong) for most of the years 
between 1988 and 2001. 
 
A problematic feature of the data is that the grouping format gives rise to irregular 
quantiles. To compound the problem, the categorization of income classes is not 
congruent across provinces and frequently changes over time. To enable spatial and 
temporal comparison, it is thus necessary to estimate the probability density functions 
(PDFs) of the distributions from the published data. In the income distribution literature, a 
number of parametric models have been proposed for such purpose. None of these models 
enjoy established superiority over the others. Considering that the 375 distributions are 
likely to be rather diverse both spatially and temporally and that the number of data points 
available for estimating each distribution also differs, we feel it unpromising to search for 
a parametric form that would approximate all the distributions reasonably well. By 
contrast, the non-parametric method of kernel density estimation offers an appealing 
alternative in that it does not require a priori specification of any particular functional 
form.3 
 
Kernel density estimation was recently applied by Sala-i-Martin (2002a and 2002b) to 
estimate income inequality among world citizens.4 Further explanation of the method can 
be found in the Sala-i-Martin papers. Suffice it to note here that we use the Rosenblatt-
                                                 
2 Most published studies about China’s income distribution rely on the NBS data. Some studies use data 
from household surveys conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in collaboration 
with a team of economists based outside China. The latter surveys cover around a third of the 31 provinces 
and are available for 1988 and 1995 only. 
3 At the exploring stage, we tried fitting parametric models to the data. We experimented with the log-
normal distribution and the Beta and General Quadratic (GQ) Lorenz curves, complete with the quantile-by-
quantile mean-fitting method proposed in Shorrocks and Wan (2004). This procedure did not always yield 
meaningful Lorenz curves. Where it did, we found that the differences between the resulted distribution and 
that produced by kernel density estimation lie primarily at the upper tail. 
4 Milanovic’s (2002) objection to the use of kernel density estimation in Sala-i-Martin (2002a, 2002b) is 
that there is too little information (Sala-i-Martin uses quintile data) to infer the shape of entire distributions, 
especially that of the upper tails. This is essentially a criticism of the data rather than of the estimation 
method. Any estimation method, parametric or non-parametric, can only produce as good an approximation 
to the true distribution as the data allow.  In our dataset, we have on average 8 data points for a distribution 
and typically greater concentration of data for the lower part of the distribution which is the focus of this 
paper. 
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Parzen density estimate with the standard normal density function as the kernel.5 The 
bandwidth of the kernel is set individually for each province at 150.9 nσ −× × , where  is 
the average of the standard deviations of the logarithmic income of the province and n is 
the number of available data points. The figure in Appendix B presents for each province 
the estimated PDFs for three selected years: the first and last years for which the 
distributional data of the province are included in the sample, and either year 1995 or year 
1996 depending on whether data for the former is available.
σ
6 
 
It is easy to see from Appendix B that for nearly all provinces the entire distribution has 
moved to the right. Unless there have been widespread switching of fortunes between the 
members of high and low income groups, this implies that an overwhelming majority of 
urban residents saw their real income grow in this period. It is also obvious that income 
inequality has increased since the distributions have become more dispersed in all cases 
except Gansu, for which information is available only for the limited period of 1990–
1997. For the three province-level cities, it appears that a second local mode is gradually 
taking shape on the high income end, indicating a tendency towards polarization.7 
 
Of more interest for this paper is what happened to the lower tails of the PDFs. It can be 
seen that, for all provinces, the lower tails have grown longer over the period. Thus, the 
income of the poor has not been grown as fast as the average income and, accordingly, 
the income shares of the poor must have fallen. Compared either with the contemporary 
income growths of the other groups or with its own record in the previous years, the 
income growth of the poor seems to have been particularly slow since the mid-1990s. In a 
number of provinces, e.g., Shanxi, Anhui, Hunan, Guizhou and Guangxi, real income 
growth of the poor may have stagnated.  
 
Rising regional disparity in China has attracted much attention recently. In order to assess 
if there is any distinct regional pattern in the provincial PDFs, the plots in Appendix B are 
organized into six regional groups based on the geographical and economic characteristics 
as suggested in Démurger et al. (2002). As expected, the PDFs of the richer eastern 
provinces, including the three province-level cities and the coastal provinces, are further 
to the right along the income axis. Concerning the income share of the poor, however, 
little is discernible from eyeballing the plots. We thus turn to some quantitative measures 
of the income share of the poor. 
 
We define the poor as, alternately, the bottom 5, 10 and 20 per cent of the population with 
the lowest income. Given an estimated PDF  of log income, a person is considered 
poor if his or her annual real income Y satisfies 
( )p x
ln
( )
Y
p x dx s
−∞
<∫ , where s = 0.05, 0.1 or 0.2 
depending on which of the three definitions is used. The income shares of the poorest 5, 
10 and 20 per cent of the provincial residents are calculated as8  
 
                                                 
5 Using the Epanechinikov kernel yields similar results. 
6 The horizontal axis denotes the logarithm of income in 1981 prices. 
7 This is of course subject to the caveat that data for the high income groups are likely to contain more 
errors. 
8 
ln *
( )
Y x Pe p x dx Y
−∞
=∫ is the mean income of the poor, s is the population share of the poor, ( )xe p x dx Y+∞
−∞
=∫  
is the average income of all residents, the income share of the poor is thus given by /PY s Y× . 
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where , 0.1 and 0.2 respectively. 
ln *
( ) ,  and 0.05
Y
p x dx s s
−∞
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Shown in Figure 1 are the cross-section boxplots over 1988–2001 for each of the three 
sets of income shares. The cross-section dispersions of the three measures do not appear 
to have changed much, yet a trend decline is visible in all of them. To assess the 
magnitude of the decline and to detect if any regional differences are present, four 
regressions were run on the pooled data on a time trend and dummy variables for three 
different groupings of the provinces.9 As the results reported in Table 1 show, income 
distributions tend to become less favourable to the poor, the further one moves away from 
the coast. In the two- and three-region groupings (coastal-inland and coastal-central-
western), the income shares of the poor in the coastal provinces are clearly higher than 
those in the other provinces (referring to the coefficients on the coastal dummies in 
regressions 2–3). Between the central and the western provinces, the poor in the former 
region obtain a larger share of total provincial income. When a finer classification of the 
provinces is adopted, the income distributions in the three province-level cities are the 
most favourable to the poor, followed by those in the three north eastern provinces and 
the other provinces along the coast. The sparsely populated yet resource-rich north 
western provinces have the least favourable income distribution for the poor. However, 
there appears to be ample variations within the groups that the average income shares of 
the coastal, central and north eastern groups are not statistically different from that of the 
south western group, the base group in regression 4. For all these regional differences in 
the levels of the income shares, an across-the-board decline is confirmed for all three of 
the income share measures. The magnitudes of the coefficient estimates on the time trend 
are stable across different specifications. At the estimated rates of decline, the three 
measures could have fallen by 20 to 30 per cent over the period on average. We also tried 
introducing interaction terms between the time trend and the regional dummies into 
regressions 3 and 4. However, due to multicollinearity caused by high correlations 
between the regional dummies and their interaction terms, the interaction terms are never 
precisely estimated and hence dropped from the regression. 
 
[Figure 1 and Table 1 near here] 
 
What part might globalization have played in bringing about the above outcomes? In 
trying to answer this question, looking at the bivariate correlations between globalization 
and the income shares of the poor alone does not get one very far, for the temporal and 
spatial correlations between the two present a paradox. Two of the well-know facts about 
China’s globalization process are: (1) China, as a whole, has markedly increased its 
integration with the world economy since the mid-1980s; and (2) the scale, intensity and 
speed of the opening-up process are much greater in the eastern seaboard than in the 
inland provinces. Thus, time-wise, the presence of a trend decline in the income shares of 
the poor implies that globalization cannot be pro-poor in the sense that it benefits the rich 
more than proportionately; space-wise, however, the proposition that globalization is anti-
poor would be in conflict with the finding that the poor in the provinces closer to the coast 
enjoy higher income shares. An easy compromise would be to conclude that globalization 
 
9 The members of the regional groups are listed in the notes to Table 1. 
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is a distribution-neutral force. But is that the true and full story? We now turn to a formal 
analysis of the relationship between globalization and the income shares of the poor. 
3 Globalization and the poor 
 
We adopt the following econometric framework used in Dollar and Kraay (2002) 
 0 1 ' '
P
kt kt kt k kty yα α ε= + + + +β x μ . (2) 
The equation states that the (logarithmic) mean income of the poor Pkty in location 
(province) k and period (year) t is, first of all, determined by the (logarithmic) per capita 
income, kty , in province k. Over and above the effects of kty , 
P
kty  is influenced by a 
vector of other variables  and a vector of time-invariant yet province-specific factors ktx
kμ . Upon subtracting kty from both sides of equation (2), we obtain 
 
 * * * *0 1 1 ' 'kt kt kt kt k ktl y gα α β ε= + + + + +β x μ , (3) 
 
where logPkt kt ktl y y= − + s
, α α= + , 
,10 s = 0.05, 0.1 or 0.2, is the logarithms of the income shares 
of the poor s *0 0 log
*
1 1α α= −1   and kt  is (the logarithms of) an indicator 
measuring the extent of globalization of the local economy. Our main concern in this 
paper is of course whether  enters equation (3) significantly and, if it does, what sign 
the coefficient 
g
ktg
1β  takes on. On account of the results from the preceding section, it is also 
anticipated that  will be negative, implying that the income shares of the poor fall as 
the average income grows. 
*
1α
 
It might be argued that a globalization indicator should reflect the ‘openness’ of local 
institutions, that is, it should be indicative of how conducive or restrictive local legal and 
bureaucratic procedures and regulations are to cross-border flows of goods, services and 
capital. Data on such information are hard to come by, especially at the provincial level. 
Following the common practice, the ratio of imports and exports to GDP is used to 
indicate openness to foreign trade and the ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) stock to 
GDP to indicate openness to foreign investment. While these two ratios measure two 
different aspects of globalization, they are also highly correlated in our data set, with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.79. To avoid multicollinearity and, in the meantime, ensure 
both aspects of globalization are represented in the regression analysis below, we use the 
first principle component constructed from the two ratios as the third globalization 
indicator.11  
 
Several concerns might be raised about the estimation of equation (3). The province-
specific effect term kμ can be dealt with in two ways. The first is known as the within or 
fixed-effect estimator, which amounts to transforming each variable into deviations from 
the means of the respective cross-section units. The alternative is to sweep out kμ by 
                                                 
10 See footnote 8. 
11 The first principal component explains just below 90 per cent of the total variance of the two ratios. 
Details about the compilation of these indicators, as well as definitions of the other variables used in this 
paper, can be found in Appendix A. Agénor (2003) also uses principal component analysis to derive a 
‘globalization index’. 
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taking the first difference of the regression equation. Both methods have its problems. 
Estimating the equation in first differences results in information loss, which in our case 
is accentuated by the fact that our panel is punctured by missing observations at various 
years for different provinces.12  The within estimator, on the other hand, requires for 
consistency the more stringent assumption that the right-hand side variables are strictly 
exogenous. This assumption is likely to be untenable in the present context particularly 
because per capita income ky  may be affected by income distribution , though the 
causality may not be contemporaneous. For both methods, inconsistent estimates can arise 
from measurement errors. The omission of other potential determinants of , albeit 
necessary to maintain a parsimonious model, may lead to a similar problem if the omitted 
variables are correlated with the explanatory variables included in the model. 
kl
kl
 
To address the above concerns, variant specifications of equation (3) are considered and 
their modelling results are discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.2 below. In these regressions, 
potential simultaneity is addressed by introducing instruments for the problematic 
variables ky  and . Following Ravallion (2001), we use (the log of) real GDP per capita 
as the instrument for 
ktg
ky . Despite the recent divergence between these two income 
measures observed in the national data from a wide range of developing countries 
including China, 13  the two series in our data set are highly correlated. 14  As for the 
instrument of the globalization indicators, we experimented with its lagged values, two-
year averages and using both. The regressions were conducted firstly by employing the 
within estimator, and then on the first-differenced form. These different combinations of 
alternative instruments and data transformations produced broadly similar results. The 
signs and significance of the coefficients on ky  and , in particular, are always in 
agreement. For the sake of brevity, we present below the within estimates with as the 
instrument for . 
ktg
1ktg −
ktg
3.1 The differing effects of trade and FDI 
 
In Tables 2–4, results are given for three sets of regressions where the dependent variable 
is the log income shares of, respectively, the bottom quintile, decile and 5 per cent of the 
urban residents. Each table consists of three panels summarizing the results of using 
alternative globalization indicators in ten regressions. Column 1 gives the results of OLS 
regression on pooled data (i.e., k =μ μ  for k = 1, …, 29) and column 2 OLS with fixed 
effects. As discussed above, the OLS estimates may be inconsistent and biased towards 
zero. They are reported here for comparison purpose. The estimates in the remaining eight 
columns are all produced using instrumental variable (IV) estimation. 
 
[Tables 2–4 near here] 
 
In a study of 92 countries over four decades, Dollar and Kraay (2002) concluded that ‘the 
general relationship between growth of income of the poor and growth of mean income is 
                                                 
12 On taking first differences, the number of observations in our panel is reduced by 38, or about one-tenth 
of our sample size. 
13 Ravallion (2003a) examines discrepancies between income data from household surveys and those from 
national accounts. 
14 The logarithms of the two series have a correlation coefficient of 0.86. 
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one-to-one’. Translated into the notation in equation (3), that proposition is equivalent to 
the coefficient on real income per capita  being statistically insignificant. As can be 
seen from Tables 2–4, our results show that  is not only significant but also negative. 
This result holds consistently for all three income shares across different globalization 
indicators, model specifications and estimation methods. Moreover, it seems that the 
further left down the Lorenz curve is the income share (the dependent variable), the 
greater is the magnitude of  in its equation. For China’s urban poor, therefore, the 
rising tide has not lifted their boats by as much and/or as quickly as it has elsewhere. 
Considering that income inequality in China was low before the mid-1980s, it is perhaps 
not much of a surprise that China’s experience should prove exception to the Dollar-
Kraay proposition.
*
1α
*
1α
*
1α
15 Nonetheless, it reminds one that caution should be exercised when 
generalizing findings from cross-country studies to individual economies. 
 
The result of a more surprising nature is that with the coefficient on the globalization 
indicator 1β . Across the first panels of Tables 2–4, 1β  is found to be positive and 
significant at conventional levels for every regression with the exception of the OLS with 
fixed effects in column 2. The latter estimates are probably biased, anyway. Here, again, 
our results sit at odds with those in Dollar and Kraay (2002) and, for that matter, with 
those from several other cross-country studies on trade openness and income inequality.16 
In contrast to the findings in the other studies that trade openness either has no impact on 
the income share of the poor or is inequality-increasing, our results suggest that trade 
helps the poor gain a larger share from aggregate income growth or, equivalently, reduces 
the ‘losses’ they would otherwise suffer. However, the magnitude of this salutary effect of 
trade is rather small, about one-tenth of the negative effect of aggregate income growth. 
Inferring from the estimates in Table 2, a doubling of the trade/GDP ratio would only 
increase the income share of the bottom quintile by about 3 per cent from, say, 12 per cent 
to 12.4 per cent, assuming other things being equal. The elasticity appears to be slightly 
higher for the bottom decile and the bottom 5-per cent, but not by a large margin. 
 
When an interaction term of trade openness with either a location dummy for the coastal 
provinces or a time dummy for the post-1992 years are added to the regression 
equation,17 the above results concerning *1α  and 1β  continue to hold. As indicated by the 
estimates in column 4, the trade effect is not exclusive to the coastal provinces. While this 
is reassuring, the results in column 5 would give some cause for concern. It seems that the 
equalizing effect of trade openness has weakened substantially since the early 1990s, and 
all the more so for the poorer groups. 
 
All the preceding findings constitute only half of the picture. On moving to the second 
panel, one can no longer identify any significant effect of globalization on the income 
shares of the poor. Furthermore, the negative and significant coefficient on the time 
interaction term (p1992) actually points to an inequality-increasing role of globalization 
since 1992. The crucial difference between the regressions in the first panel and those in 
the second panel is, of course, the use of different globalization indicators. It is not our 
                                                 
15 Ravallion (2003b) presents evidence that within-country inequality in developing countries converges 
towards medium levels. 
16 See, for example, Barro (1999) and Spilimbergo, Londono and Szekely (1999). 
17 Deing Xiao Ping’s tour of South China in 1992 is widely viewed as marking the resumption of China’s 
reform and opening-up process that had stalled after 1989. 
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intention in this paper to investigate what accounts for the differing effects of openness to 
trade and openness to foreign investment, or what mechanism has been at work to have 
brought about the attenuation of the positive trade effect. Many a model in the literature 
has demonstrated that the distributional effects of trade and FDI can be sensitive to 
assumptions about labour mobility, market distortions, production technology and 
specialization, and a range of initial conditions. Most probably, the results seen above 
were produced by a confluence of many forces. We will nevertheless venture two 
conjectures: (1) compared with domestic indigenous export firms, foreign-funded export 
firms employ more advanced technology and thus require relatively more skilled labour; 
(2) China’s export growth has been increasingly led by foreign-funded firms (FFEs). If 
the first conjecture holds true, an increase in exports by domestic firms would raise the 
demand for unskilled labour and thus improves the lot of the poor, whereas an increase in 
exports by FFEs would raise the demand for more skilled labour, leaving little effect on 
or even depressing the income of the poor. Since both domestic firms and FFEs engage in 
trade, we would observe a positive effect of trade on the income shares of the poor and a 
near-zero or no effect on the part of FDI as long as domestic firms contribute a growing 
share to total trade volume. If the growth of trade is led by FFEs, as postulated in 
conjecture (2), the positive distributional effect of trade will then diminish.18 
 
Given the contrasting distributional effects of trade and FDI, what would be the overall 
evaluation of the influence of globalization? The estimates in the third panel provide a 
tentative answer. The globalization indicator utilized here is constructed from trade/GDP 
and FDI/GDP ratios. By construction, it reflects variations in both series. As can be seen, 
a pattern very similar to that in the first panel emerges. Hence, it might be concluded that 
on the whole globalization increases the income shares of the poor. It is not the case that 
the poor in inland provinces has been excluded from the globalization process, as is held 
in popular belief. If anything, the results suggest that the poor in the coastal provinces 
have benefited (proportionately) less than their counterparts in the inland. Somewhat 
disturbingly, the magnitude of the positive impact has decreased since the 1990s. 
3.2 Sensitivity tests 
 
Thus far we have restricted the specification of our regression equation down to the 
minimal. This has the clear virtue of saving on the degrees of freedom. We might also 
draw some comfort from the fact that the average adjusted R-squares of the IV-estimated 
regressions with fixed effects is well over 0.81. However, relying on such a simple 
specification does risk introducing into the model serious biases stemming from 
misspecified functional form and/or omission of important explanatory variables. To test 
the robustness of the findings in section 3.1, a range of sensitivity tests have been 
conducted. 
 
We first consider the possibility that the distributional effect of globalization is nonlinear. 
One type of nonlinearity is that the effects of globalization depend on the level of 
economic development. A second type of nonlinearity resembles the shape of the ‘Laffer 
curve’, namely, globalization has an adverse effect on income distribution up to a 
                                                 
18 We note two facts supporting these conjectures. First, many of China’s indigenous export firms are 
township and village enterprises (TVEs) engaged in such industries as garment, footwear and toys that do 
not require sophisticated machinery and equipment. Second, FDI inflows to China were considerably higher 
in the 1990s than in the 1980s. 
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threshold level beyond which its effect turns positive.19 We test for the presence of both 
forms of nonlinearity by adding into the regression in column 5 an interaction term 
between kty  and and the quadratic term of . Whether they are entered separately or 
together, neither of the added terms turn out to be significant while the coefficient 
estimates on 
ktg  ktg
kty ,  and the interaction term between  and the 1992 dummy remain 
virtually unchanged. We thus conclude that the possibility of nonlinearity can be rather 
safely excluded.
ktg ktg
20 
 
One might also suspect that the ameliorative effect of globalization identified earlier is 
spurious on the ground that it is simply a consequence of both globalization and the 
income shares of the poor being correlated with a third variable/factor in the same 
direction. We examine four of such factors that are frequently mentioned in studies on 
poverty and income distribution in China. The first of these is the extent to which market 
reform has progressed. It is often argued that a more open economy is also a more 
liberalized economy. By allowing room for private businesses to flourish, a more 
liberalized economy in turn offers more employment opportunities for the poor. We use 
the proportion of the labour force employed in the non-state sector as a proxy for the 
extent of liberalization. Adding this variable to the regression produces the results in 
column 6 of Tables 2–4. It can be easily seen that liberalization can indeed exert a 
positive effect on the income shares of the poor. Equally clear is the result that the 
positive effect of liberalization does not knock out the positive effect of globalization.21 
 
The second factor we consider is the economic structure of the local economy. In an 
extensive study on poverty in China, Ravallion and Chen (2004) found that agricultural 
growth had a greater impact on poverty reduction at the national level than does the 
growth of either the industrial or the service sector. In addition, they did not find evidence 
for any significant effect of trade openness on poverty. Will these conclusions apply when 
the subject of investigation is changed to relative poverty in urban areas? In column 7 of 
Tables 2–4, the estimation results from including the GDP share of manufacturing 
industries are reported. Across the nine regressions in this column, globalization retains 
its significance, whereas the newly added variable proves insignificant. When we 
substitute this variable alternately with the GDP share of the entire industrial sector and 
with the GDP share of the service sector, there is still little sign of any significant 
relationship between the income shares of the poor and the economic structure. Herein 
lies an important caveat, however. Because no sectoral breakdown of urban GDP is 
available at the provincial level, the GDP shares used in the regressions are calculated 
from provincial totals. For individual provinces, these shares may or may not capture the 
economic structure in their urban areas. 
 
The next factor on the list is the average stock of human capital. The rationale for testing 
the effects of this factor comes from the observation that the distribution of human capital 
among the Chinese provinces, much like that of physical capital, is weighted in favour of 
the coastal region. For the lack of a more appropriate measure, the average schooling of 
the labour force is adopted and the regression results are shown in column 8. The 
                                                 
19 Agénor (2003) examines the ‘Laffer curve’ effect of globalization on the absolute level of poverty. 
20 We have also tried replacing the trade/GDP ratio with exports/GDP and FDI stock/GDP with FDI 
flow/GDP. The results are expectedly similar, given the high correlations within the two pairs of ratios. 
21 When using the share of non-state enterprises of gross industrial product as the measure of liberalization, 
we obtained similar results. 
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correlation between the income shares of the poor and average schooling is weak, 
insignificant and in most cases negative. It should be noted, however, that average 
schooling is a poor measure of the type of human capital required for the poor to 
participate better in aggregate growth. The latter is more appropriately anchored to the 
completion of primary education and basic vocational training, for which we do not have 
sufficient data. Therefore, while the results in column 8 confirm the robustness of the 
impact of globalization, they do not serve as the basis for dismissing the effect of 
augmenting the human capital of the poor. 
 
The last factor we examine is the rate of inflation. For an economy of China’s size, it is 
no surprise that both the absolute level of and the changes in prices can vary widely 
across regions. The evidence from cross-country studies shows that the poor stand to lose 
more from inflation than the rest of the population.22 In Ravallion and Chen (2004), it is 
found that changes in inflation rates are poverty-increasing. If it so happens that the extent 
of openness of a province is negatively correlated with its inflation rate, a positive 
relationship between globalization and the income shares of the poor might show up even 
if there is no underlying relationship between the two. This proposition does not ring true 
in our case, however, as the results in column 9 demonstrate. Inflation does have a 
dampening effect on the income shares of the poor, but the effect of globalization still 
comes through. 
 
As a final check, we run a regression where all the aforementioned control variables are 
included in the specification. As can be seen in column 10, the coefficient on  remains 
positive and significant in the first and third panels while the coefficient on the interaction 
term between  and the 1992 dummy remains negative and significant. To summarize 
the analysis in this section, our findings in section 3.1 prove to be robust to additional 
control variables and nonlinearity in functional forms. 
ktg
ktg
4 Conclusion 
 
This paper examines how globalization affects urban poverty in China, with two major 
objectives in mind: one substantive, and one methodological. Our substantive objective is 
to conduct the analysis at the provincial level. Such a set-up allows us to take into account 
the rich diversity in levels of development and degrees of openness across the Chinese 
provinces, an advantage over studies at the cross-country or national level. Our 
methodological objective is to tap into the wealth of statistical methods and econometric 
models developed for cross-country studies, and to apply some of them at the sub-
national level. More specifically, we adopted the kernel density estimation technique of 
Sala-i-Martin (2002a and 2002b) to recover provincial income distributions from 
irregularly grouped survey data. The income shares of three poorest groups (the bottom 
20, 10 and 5 per cent of the urban residents along the Lorenz curve) are obtained and used 
in the econometric framework of Dollar and Kraay (2002) to assess the impact of 
globalization on the poor in urban China. 
 
Our focus on the sub-national level resulted in several interesting findings that are either 
different from those in cross-country or national level studies or are completely 
overlooked in those studies. Firstly, we found that average income growth has an adverse 
                                                 
22 See, for example, Easterly and Fischer (2001). 
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effect on the income shares of the poor while globalization in general, and trade openness 
in particular, increases the income shares of the poor. Both findings are in disagreement 
with related results in Dollar and Kraay (2002). Secondly, it is seen that openness to trade 
and openness to FDI have differential, if not diametrically opposed, distributional effects. 
The inequality-reducing effect of trade was significantly attenuated after 1992, suggesting 
possible changes in the nature of the growth of trade and in the way trade impacts on the 
labour market. Finally, the benefit from globalization accrues to the poor in the inland 
provinces just as much as it does to their counterparts in the coastal region. These 
findings are robust to alternative specifications where the effect of globalization enters 
nonlinearly or where additional control variables are included. 
 
One of the basic lessons learned from economic history is that economies urbanize as 
they develop. Although China is still a predominantly rural society, there is little doubt 
that urbanization will proceed apace once restrictions on internal migration are removed. 
Among the many potential ‘growing pains’ is a resurgence of urban poverty. Increasingly, 
the battle against poverty will have to be waged in urban as well as in rural areas. Should 
promoting international trade and foreign investment remain part of the weaponry? On 
the one hand, the evidence from this paper should allay fears that globalization is merely 
pro-rich or pro-coastal provinces. On the other hand, further research is needed to look 
into the negative effect of FDI and the weakening of the positive effect of trade on the 
income shares of the poor. 
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Appendix A 
 
Data sources and definitions 
 
The data on household income distribution are collected from various provincial 
statistical yearbooks. The data for all the other variables are from Comprehensive 
Statistical Data and Materials for 50 Years of New China (China Statistical Publishing 
House, 1999) and updated to 2001 using the Statistical Yearbook of China 2000, 2001 
and 2002. 
 
The variables involved in the regressions in section 3 are defined as follows: 
 
(1) l: the logarithms of the income shares of, respectively, the bottom quintile, decile and 
5 per cent of the provincial residents along the Lorenz curve. The method of calculating 
these income shares are detailed in section 2 of the text. 
 
(2) y: the logarithm of real per capita income. This is obtained by deflating the nominal 
average incomes recorded in the survey data by the provincial price levels provided in 
Brandt and Holz (2004). 
 
(3) g: alternatively defined as the ratio of the sum of imports and exports to GDP, the 
ratio of the stock of FDI to GDP, and the first principal component of the preceding two 
ratios. The stock of FDI is accumulated from the annual flows of utilized FDI using the 
perpetual inventory method. The nominal values of FDI flows are converted to real values 
using the provincial implicit GDP deflators. The depreciation rate is set at 0.09. 
 
(4) Coast: dummy variable for coastal provinces, which include Beijing, Fujian, 
Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shanghai, Shandong, Tianjin and 
Zhejiang. 
 
(5) Time: dummy variable for 1992–2001. 
 
(6) Liberalization: the logarithm of the proportion of the labour force employed in the 
non-state sector. 
 
(7) Economic structure: the logarithm of the share of manufacturing industries in 
provincial GDP. 
 
(8) Education: average years schooling obtained from Wan, Lu and Chen (2005). 
 
(9) Inflation: annual inflation rate in decimal. The rates are calculated from the price 
levels in Brandt and Holz (2004). 
Appendix B The estimated provincial probability density functions of log incomes 
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(d) Central provinces 
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Table 1 Trend and regional differences in the income shares of the poor 
 
Regression 1  Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
Regressors 20% 10% 5%  20% 10% 5% 20% 10% 5% 20% 10% 5% 
Intercept 11.241 4.926 2.206  10.999 4.786 2.132 10.762 4.660 2.072 11.252 4.920 2.201 
 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Time trend -0.179 -0.092 -0.044  -0.180 -0.092 -0.045 -0.179 -0.092 -0.044 -0.181 -0.093 -0.045 
 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Coastala     0.640 0.371 0.195 0.874 0.495 0.254 0.213 0.140 0.073 
     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.124 0.046 0.035 
Centralb        0.449 0.238 0.115 0.098 0.051 0.022 
        0.000 0.000 0.000 0.411 0.400 0.470 
3 citiesc           0.744 0.447 0.244 
           0.000 0.000 0.000 
Northeastd           0.181 0.113 0.060 
           0.176 0.095 0.080 
Northweste           -0.816 -0.438 -0.221 
           0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: 
The figures in italics are the marginal significance values of the t-statistics of the 
coefficient estimates. In regression 4, the base group consists of the south western 
provinces: Guangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan and Yunnan. The other groups are defined as 
follows: 
a. In regressions 2–3, coastal provinces include Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, 
Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shanghai, Shandong, Tianjin and Zhejiang. In regressions 4, 
Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Liaoning are assigned to other groups. 
b. In regressions 2–3, central provinces include Anhui, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, 
Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Jiangxi, Jilin and Shanxi. In regressions 4, Heilongjiang, Jilin 
and Inner Mongolia are assigned to other groups. 
c. The three province-level cities are Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin. 
d. The north eastern provinces include Liaoning, Heilongjiang and Jilin. 
e. The north western provinces are Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Shaanxi, Qinghai, 
and Xinjiang.  
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Table 2 Globalization and the income shares of the poor: bottom quintile 
Independent 
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
        
Globalization indicator: trade/GDP ratio        
           
Globalization g 0.029 0.011 0.030 0.032 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.025 0.040 0.045
 0.001 0.301 0.021 0.052 0.035 0.028 0.028 0.057 0.007 0.003
Per capita income y -0.145 -0.300 -0.319 -0.319 -0.338 -0.354 -0.338 -0.309 -0.372 -0.381
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Coast × g    -0.004       
    0.843       
p1992 × g     -0.008 -0.010 -0.006 -0.008 -0.011 -0.012
     0.054 0.026 0.155 0.058 0.009 0.008
Liberalization     0.046    0.063
      0.113    0.038
Economic structure      0.056   0.096
       0.122   0.015
Education        -0.012  -0.011
        0.460  0.510
Inflation         -0.100 -0.134
         0.016 0.002
Adjusted R2 0.096 0.691 0.815 0.812 0.807 0.808 0.808 0.808 0.807 0.798
           
Globalization indicator: FDI stock /GDP ratio 
           
Globalization g 0.003 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.005
 0.647 0.319 0.187 0.164 0.925 0.567 0.946 0.905 0.973 0.571
Per capita income y -0.115 -0.309 -0.329 -0.320 -0.325 -0.351 -0.325 -0.295 -0.346 -0.355
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Coast × g    -0.008       
    0.249       
p1992× g     -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.012 -0.012
     0.004 0.003 0.008 0.006 0.000 0.000
Liberalization     0.051    0.060
      0.106    0.081
Economic structure      0.034   0.060
       0.332   0.099
Education        -0.013  -0.012
        0.443  0.497
Inflation         -0.081 -0.104
         0.039 0.009
Adjusted R2 0.094 0.689 0.809 0.808 0.805 0.803 0.804 0.804 0.804 0.797
           
Globalization indicator: 1st principal component of trade/GDP and FDI/GDP 
           
Globalization g 0.011 0.008 0.013 0.039 0.032 0.029 0.033 0.032 0.039 0.048 
 0.035 0.073 0.024 0.053 0.001 0.025 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.004 
Per capita income y -0.133 -0.306 -0.323 -0.334 -0.346 -0.349 -0.350 -0.350 -0.373 -0.451
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Coast × g    -0.025       
    0.187       
 23
p1992× g     -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.014 -0.015
     0.023 0.051 0.032 0.025 0.007 0.013 
Liberalization     -0.026    -0.037
      0.572    0.426 
Economic structure      0.155   0.258 
       0.089   0.021 
Education        0.002  0.012 
        0.931  0.487 
Inflation         -0.092 -0.124
         0.025 0.005 
Adjusted R2 0.097 0.690 0.815 0.814 0.806 0.805 0.804 0.804 0.805 0.798
Notes: 
See Appendix for the definition of the variables. Figures in italics are the marginal 
significance levels of the t-statistics of the corresponding estimates. 
Estimation methods used for each regression are as follows: 
(1) OLS regression on pooled data. The standard errors of the coefficient estimates are 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and first-order autocorrelation using the Newey-West 
procedure. 
(2) OLS estimation with fixed effects. 
(3)–(10) IV estimation with fixed effects. 
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Table 3 Globalization and the income shares of the poor: bottom decile 
Independent 
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
        
Globalization indicator: trade/GDP ratio        
           
Globalization g 0.040 0.015 0.040 0.039 0.037 0.039 0.038 0.033 0.047 0.052
 0.000 0.229 0.014 0.059 0.024 0.018 0.021 0.045 0.008 0.006
Per capita income y -0.170 -0.360 -0.385 -0.385 -0.408 -0.431 -0.408 -0.363 -0.439 -0.436
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Coast × g    0.003       
    0.901       
p1992× g     -0.010 -0.013 -0.008 -0.010 -0.013 -0.015
     0.046 0.018 0.112 0.049 0.013 0.009
Liberalization     0.064    0.078
      0.070    0.037
Economic structure      0.052   0.089
       0.248   0.064
Education        -0.018  -0.018
        0.344  0.366
Inflation         -0.090 -0.126
         0.076 0.018
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.681 0.809 0.810 0.804 0.802 0.803 0.804 0.803 0.795
           
Globalization indicator: FDI stock /GDP ratio 
           
Globalization g 0.007 0.006 0.010 0.010 -0.001 0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.004
 0.452 0.370 0.244 0.228 0.882 0.693 0.871 0.906 0.850 0.712
Per capita income y -0.135 -0.368 -0.391 -0.384 -0.386 -0.419 -0.386 -0.335 -0.403 -0.396
 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Coast × g    -0.006       
    0.481       
p1992× g     -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.015 -0.015
     0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000
Liberalization     0.066    0.070
      0.085    0.097
Economic structure      0.024   0.048
       0.572   0.284
Education        -0.022  -0.021
        0.280  0.324
Inflation         -0.066 -0.093
         0.168 0.054
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.680 0.809 0.809 0.803 0.801 0.803 0.802 0.803 0.794
           
Globalization indicator: 1st principal component of trade/GDP and FDI/GDP 
           
Globalization g 0.012 0.013 0.021 0.051 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.052 0.057 
 0.040 0.020 0.004 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Per capita income y -0.151 -0.372 -0.395 -0.408 -0.425 -0.434 -0.430 -0.434 -0.453 -0.497
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Coast × g    -0.030       
    0.194       
 25
p1992× g     -0.015 -0.018 -0.015 -0.015 -0.018 -0.021
     0.015 0.008 0.020 0.016 0.006 0.003 
Liberalization     0.164    0.237 
      0.201    0.083 
Economic structure      0.156   0.282 
       0.164   0.027 
Education        0.004  0.006 
        0.878  0.782 
Inflation         -0.094 -0.112
         0.062 0.032 
Adjusted R2 0.084 0.682 0.811 0.810 0.804 0.803 0.804 0.804 0.803 0.796
Notes: see notes to Table 2.
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Table 4 Globalization and the income shares of the poor: bottom 5 per cent 
 
Independent 
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
        
Globalization indicator: trade/GDP ratio        
           
Globalization g 0.046 0.013 0.040 0.036 0.036 0.038 0.037 0.031 0.047 0.051
 0.000 0.372 0.032 0.119 0.055 0.042 0.050 0.093 0.022 0.017
Per capita income y -0.179 -0.393 -0.420 -0.421 -0.450 -0.478 -0.450 -0.401 -0.484 -0.481
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Coast × g    0.008       
    0.799       
p1992× g     -0.012 -0.016 -0.011 -0.012 -0.016 -0.019
     0.027 0.009 0.064 0.029 0.008 0.005
Liberalization     0.077    0.091
      0.055    0.032
Economic structure      0.048   0.089
       0.346   0.105
Education        -0.020  -0.020
        0.373  0.380
Inflation         -0.096 -0.133
         0.097 0.029
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.663 0.808 0.809 0.801 0.801 0.802 0.803 0.803 0.784
 
Globalization indicator: FDI stock /GDP ratio 
           
Globalization g 0.009 0.007 0.012 0.012 -0.001 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.005
 0.373 0.373 0.219 0.205 0.923 0.648 0.914 0.946 0.890 0.668
Per capita income y -0.143 -0.404 -0.433 -0.426 -0.427 -0.467 -0.427 -0.373 -0.447 -0.443
 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Coast × g    -0.007       
    0.495       
p1992× g     -0.015 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.017 -0.017
     0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000
Liberalization     0.078    0.082
      0.075    0.089
Economic structure      0.022   0.049
       0.654   0.334
Education        -0.023  -0.023
        0.310  0.351
Inflation         -0.076 -0.104
         0.165 0.059
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.662 0.808 0.808 0.799 0.798 0.797 0.798 0.796 0.785
           
Globalization indicator: 1st principal component of trade/GDP and FDI/GDP 
           
Globalization g 0.014 0.015 0.025 0.059 0.053 0.053 0.054 0.055 0.061 0.067 
 0.041 0.021 0.003 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Per capita income y -0.158 -0.409 -0.439 -0.453 -0.473 -0.483 -0.478 -0.491 -0.506 -0.562
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Coast × g    -0.033       
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    0.206       
p1992× g     -0.017 -0.020 -0.017 -0.018 -0.021 -0.024
     0.015 0.008 0.020 0.016 0.006 0.003 
Liberalization     0.184    0.268 
      0.208    0.088 
Economic structure      0.170   0.318 
       0.185   0.031 
Education        0.007  0.010 
        0.794  0.706 
Inflation         -0.110 -0.130
         0.057 0.032 
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.663 0.811 0.809 0.799 0.799 0.798 0.799 0.797 0.785
Notes: see notes to Table 2. 
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Figure 1 Boxplots of the income shares of the poor 
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